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PARITY REVISITED: THE USES OF A JUDICIAL FORUM
OF EXCELLENCE
Burt Neuborne*
Longer ago than I wish to acknowledge, I urged judges and legis-
lators to consider qualitative differences between state and federal
systems in drawing jurisdictional lines in constitutional cases.' I ar-
gued that a series of institutional factors (including procedural dif-
ferences) combined to give federal courts a comparative qualitative
advantage for the individual in deciding close constitutional cases, at
least at the trial level.' I pressed what would today be called a
"weak" version of disparity.' My point was not that state courts
were incompetent or acting in bad faith, but that institutional fac-
tors would tend, over time, to make federal trial courts a more effec-
tive counter-majoritarian forum than their state counterparts.4 My
perception was hardly novel. Virtually any experienced constitu-
tional litigator could - and would - have told the same tale in the
1970's. Moreover, I pressed a weak version of the consequences of
my argument, urging merely that impact on substantive decision-
making be considered along with the traditional factors in allocating
business between state and federal courts.'
Much has changed in seventeen years. Academics have vigorously
* John Norton Pomeroy Professor of Law, New York University Law School.
1. Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1131 (1977) [hereinafter
Neuborne, Myth of Parity]; Burt Neuborne, Toward Procedural Parity in Constitutional Litiga-
tion, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 725, 727 (1981) [hereinafter Neuborne, Toward Procedural
Parity].
2. Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, supra note 1, at 1118-19.
3. Commentators in the parity debate have distinguished between a "strong" disparity argu-
ment which verges on suggesting that state courts are inadequate as counter-majoritarian fora and
a "weak" version which concedes the basic competence of state courts, but argues that the federal
forum is institutionally better suited to the protection of the unpopular individual. This distinction
is carefully described in Michael Wells, Behind the Parity Debate: The Decline of the Legal
Process Tradition in the Law of Federal Courts, 71 B.U. L. REV. 609, 610 (1991). A similar
dichotomy exists in the debate over diversity jurisdiction. See Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the
Allocation of Judicial Business Between State and Federal Courts: Federal Jurisdiction and the
"Martian Chronicles," 78 VA. L. REV. 1769, 1799-1808 (1992).
4. Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, supra note I, at 727.
5. Neuborne, Toward Procedural Parity, supra note 1, at 1117-18.
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disputed the existence of qualitative differences between state and
federal courts6 and it has been impossible to resolve the dispute em-
pirically, principally because no agreement exists about what we
mean as "better." 7 The Supreme Court is no longer an engine of
egalitarian reform. The lower federal courts have been politically
altered by twelve years of openly ideological appointments. Several
state courts have emerged as effective protectors of constitutional
values. The changes have led some thoughtful observers to declare
the parity debate passe.'
Given the changes, I agree that state/federal qualitative differ-
ences no longer play the role they played in the 60's and 70's in
constitutional cases. In part, the change is due to a modest renas-
cence in state constitutional jurisprudence. Mostly, though, it flows
6. See, e.g., Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, Constitutional Litigation in Federal and
State Courts: An Empirical Analysis, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 213, 214 (1983) (comparing
results of all cases by: 1) court system; 2) outcome versus forum by case type; and 3) outcome
versus forum for various subsamples, and arguing that parity could empirically be established);
David L. Shapiro, Federal Habeas Corpus: A Study in Massachusetts, 87 HARV. L. REv. 321,
327-28 (1973) (noting the different treatment of habeas corpus issues between the federal and
state courts); Michael Wells, Habeas Corpus and Freedom of Speech, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1307,
1308 (recognizing the relationship between federal and state issues in the treatment and the scope
of habeas corpus in the context of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment). For more
recent studies skeptical of the existence of a disparity, see Michael E. Solimine & James L.
Walker, Rethinking Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction, 52 U. PITT. L. REv. 383, 411-18 (1991);
Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, State Court Protection of Federal Constitutional
Rights, 12 HARV. JL. PUB. POL'Y 127, 131 (1989).
As Susan Herman notes, the Solimine & Walker studies actually support a weak view of dis-
parity. Susan N. Herman, Why Parity Matters, 71 B.U. L. Rev. 651, 660 (1991). She notes that
their figures show that federal courts were 11.5% to 13.5% more likely to uphold a federal consti-
tutional claim than a state counterpart. Id. I argued that it was precisely in the close cases, where
reasonable judges might disagree, that the institutional differences would affect outcome.
Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, supra note 1, at 416-17.
7. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary, 36
UCLA L. REV. 233, 278-79 (1988) [hereinafter Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered] (stating that
"without empirical measurement each side of the parity debate has an intuitive judgment about
whether the institutional differences between state and federal courts matter in constitutional
cases"); Martin H. Redish, Judicial Parity, Litigant Choice, and Democratic Theory: A Com-
ment on Federal Jurisdiction and Constitutional Rights, 36 UCLA L. REV. 329, 338 (1988)
[hereinafter Thedish, Judicial Parity] ("The absence of dispositive empirical data does not revoke
common sense.").
8. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Ending the Parity Debate, 71 B.U. L. REV. 593, 594 (1991)
[hereinafter Chemerinsky, Parity Debate] (stating that with conservative Reagan and Bush nomi-
nees dominating the federal bench, it is unrealistic to assume that federal courts are more likely
than state courts to protect constitutional liberties); Wells, supra note 6, at 610 (1991) (stating
that there seems to be general agreement that weak parity exists, but that strong parity does not).
But see Herman, supra note 6, at 657 (arguing that because the majority of Supreme Court
Justices and members of Congress still recognize a kind of parity between federal and state courts,
the dispensation with the parity debate is inappropriate).
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from a general decline in the ability to win a novel individual rights
case anywhere. Unmistakable signals sent by the Supreme Court 9
(and the people), coupled with the remaking of the federal judiciary
during the Reagan/Bush years,' ° have made conscientious judges -
both state and federal - skeptical about efforts to push individual
rights law beyond settled doctrine." Nowadays, it doesn't much
matter where you make a novel individual rights argument; it isn't
likely to win.
Despite the changes, though, in those areas of constitutional law
where existing Supreme Court doctrine holds open the chance of
doctrinal growth,'2 I continue to believe that a relative institutional
advantage for the plaintiff exists in federal court; an advantage re-
sulting from a mix of political insulation, tradition, better resources
and superior professional competence.'3 Perhaps it is the myopia of
a closed mind, but the years have reinforced my perceptions about
the qualitative differences between state and federal trial courts.
Through literally hundreds of constitutional cases, I have found a
perceptible difference in the trial-level quality of judging in the two
systems. While I have encountered state trial judges of great talent
and a few federal judges who do not deserve to be on the bench, in
the bulk of cases, regardless of outcome,"' I believe that federal
judges performed at a higher professional level than their state
counterparts. While most state trial benches performed competently,
some federal trial judges achieved excellence. I do not wish to be
misunderstood. I do not suggest that a crisis of competence exists at
the state trial level; nor do I suggest that Cardozo has been rein-
carnated at the federal level. I do assert, though, that the average
quality of professional judging at the federal trial level was "better"
than at the state trial level, measured any way you want to -
9. See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 860 (1993) (holding that the defendant's claim
of actual innocence did not entitle him to federal habeas corpus relief).
10. See Chemerinsky, Parity Debate, supra note 8, at 594 (noting that Reagan and Bush ap-
pointees dominate the federal bench).
11. See Redish, Judicial Parity, supra note 7, at 337 ("[l]t might be argued that in light of
numerous conservative appointments to the federal bench in recent years, federal judges are often
less likely to find in favor of the party asserting the constitutional right than the state courts.").
12. The 'takings' area, for example. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825
(1987).
13. For similar perceptions, see Redish, Judicial Parity, supra note 7, at 337; Wells, supra note
6, at 610.
14. 1 have tried to resist the temptation to confuse quality with acceptance of my litigation
position.
1995]
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speed, technical proficiency, treatment of precedent, persuasiveness,
imagination, or intangible judgment; and that, occasionally, judging
at the federal level transcended competence. Moreover, while,
thankfully, the quality of judging in both systems rarely fell below
competence generously defined, when it did so, more often it was at
the state level.
I believe that my colleagues in the litigating bar share this per-
ception. If they could talk frankly, I suspect that they would report
a perceived quality gap between the average performance of state
and federal trial benches. That is one reason why lawyers expend so
much time and ingenuity jousting over questions of federal jurisdic-
tion. Unfortunately, however, judicial policymakers, for understand-
able reasons, cannot openly acknowledge the existence of a quality
gap. 5 Instead, they develop "neutral" roadmaps of the ideal alloca-
tion of business between state and federal courts, pretending that
the two systems are qualitatively fungible.1 6 While there is much
wisdom to be found in recent efforts to rationalize the allocation of
state and federal judicial business,1 7 until we acknowledge the qual-
ity gap that separates the two systems, I do not believe that we will
ask a (perhaps the) crucial allocation question: What is the best use
of a trial forum capable of excellence in a judicial system where the
norm is minimal competence?
Suppose each state were to maintain an underfunded system of
medical clinics 8 committed to serving 99% of the general health
care needs of the population, staffed by health professionals chosen
mainly by political parties and required to provide care to virtually
all who request it. Suppose, also, that the underfunded state medical
system, over time, painfully develops a competent corps of profes-
sionals who succeed in providing adequate but undistinguished ser-
15. Such an acknowledgment would tarnish the public perception of state courts, and therefore,
frustrate their integrity.
16. For helpful recent efforts to rationalize the allocation of business between state and federal
courts, see Erwin Chemerinsky & Larry Kramer, Defining the Role of the Federal Courts, 1990
B.Y.U. L. REV. 67, 68; Richard H. Fallon, The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV.
1141, 1145 (1988); Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation of Judicial Business Between
State and Federal Courts: Federal Jurisdiction and the "Martian Chronicles", 78 VA. L. REv.
1769, 1770-71 (1992) [hereinafter Redish, Reassessing].
17. See Redish, Reassessing, supra note 16, at 1825 (stating that "the modern Supreme Court
has long premised its structuring of federal and state judicial relations on the assumptions that
state and federal courts are fungible").
18. The hypothetical could equally be cast in educational terms, with teachers substituted for
health professionals.
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vice to the mass of the population. Suppose, finally, that the federal
system maintains a parallel set of better funded clinics designed to
deal with about 1 % of the nation's health needs staffed with corps
of physicians chosen on the basis of merit. Who should the federal
clinics treat?
I do not know the answer, but I am certain that it should be
framed, at least in part, in terms of how best to use medical institu-
tion capable of excellence in a world in which minimal competence
is the norm. Should we think about state/federal judicial allocation
in the same way?
Three objections to phrasing the allocation question in qualitative
terms immediately arise. First, my assertion of a quality differential
may be wrong, aberrational, or even unduly affected by the nature
of a constitutional practice. Perhaps one or all three outcomes are
correct. At this stage of the discussion, though, there is no need to
get bogged down in arguments about how to measure quality. I con-
cede at the outset that the quality differential cannot be proven in a
way that would satisfy a social scientist. Indeed, many settings, the
quality differential does not exist, or is so small that it affects noth-
ing except aesthetics. Moreover, in many cases, outcome is a fore-
gone conclusion regardless of the level of quality of the judging. Fi-
nally, I am concentrating solely on a comparison at the trial level. I
make no assertion about the relative quality of appellate judging in
the two systems, although the workload of most intermediate state
appellate courts is crushing. On the other hand, it would be miracu-
lous if quality differentials did not arise between two judicial sys-
tems with grossly disproportionate resources, 9 greatly unbalanced
time demands,20 differing judicial selection techniques21 and dispa-
rate traditions.2 At this point, I will let the matter rest with an
assertion and ask merely that we consider what the allocation rules
should be if there were a quality differential.
A second objection to phrasing the judicial allocation question in
medical or educational terms is that legal issues divide substantively
or functionally into state and federal spheres,23 while medical and
19. Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, supra note 1, at 1121-22.
20. See id. at 1122 n.67 (discussing the drastically higher caseload in the state system).
21. Id. at 1127-28.
22. Id. at 1124; see also HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEw 28-29
(1973) ("Honorific motives of distinction have drawn even to the lower federal bench lawyers of
the highest quality .... ").
23. See MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDI-
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educational services are arguably federalism neutral. My response is
twofold. First, I fully agree that functional analysis related to inher-
ent state/federal spheres should play a role in allocating judicial
business. I argue only that functional analysis be supplemented by a
perception that qualitative differences exist that should be taken
into account in the final allocation decision.
A final objection is that judges (especially common law and con-
stitutional judges), unlike doctors and teachers, actually generate
their raw material by making avowedly discretionary, often political
choices about how the law should grow.24 Unlike judges, doctors do
not create or knowingly alter the conditions they treat. Thus, while
the capacity for technical excellence is critical to a doctor or a
teacher, it is only one component in the armory of skills needed by a
judge/lawmaker. I plead guilty, therefore, to over-emphasizing tech-
nical proficiency in defining excellence in judging. In some sense, I
am over-emphasizing as a gauge of judicial quality, the time, re-
sources and considerable intellectual ability needed to perform well
as a "legal process," or more recently, a Dworkinian or Posnerian
judge. 25 But, while I willingly acknowledge that such attributes do
not exhaust what it takes to be an excellent judge, I do not believe
that attributes unrelated to technical excellence (like empathy, com-
passion, demeanor and diverse life-experience) should play a sub-
stantial role in allocating jurisdiction (even though they are impor-
tant in assessing ultimate judicial quality) because such attributes
exist in equal parts in both state and federal settings. We are not
yet at a point where an intellectually superior federal bench with a
myopic view of the world must be compared with a less technically
proficient state bench with the capacity to reflect diverse life exper-
iences. As of now, neither bench is particularly diverse. One hopes
CIAL POWER 3 (1980) ("It seems intuitively appropriate to provide federal courts the primary
responsibility for adjudicating federal law, and leave as the primary function of state courts the
defining and expounding of state policies and principles.").
24. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). In Brown, the Court
made a political choice about how and where the law should grow - in that case, away from the
separation of races. Id. at 495. Thus, judges, unlike teachers and doctors, often create the very
legal constructs which guide their subsequent decisions. See also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S.
452 (1991) (recognizing judges as "policy making employees" within the meaning of the Age
Discrimination Act).
25. See Redish, Judicial Parity, supra note 7, at 331 ("Neither . . . judicial IQ, nor the
judges' law school records can accurately depict the comparative competence levels of state and
federal judges."); Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered, supra note 7, at 256-61 (arguing that no
viable means exists that would enable one to empirically examine judicial competence in the par-
ity debate).
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that diversity will characterize both systems in the years to come
making such comparisons irrelevant.
If the above objections are surmounted, what implications should
a so-called quality gap between potential excellence and competence
have for the allocation of judicial business? One possible response is
none. At least one commentator argues that all any litigant is enti-
tled to is a minimally competent judge.26 If state trial courts are
competent, the existence of an elite federal trial bench can simply
be viewed as a random stroke of good fortune, with judicial business
allocated strictly on the basis of functional or substantive criteria
that ignore the quality gap. I'm not certain that such an approach
would be wrong, especially since I suspect that whatever the alloca-
tive criteria, they will often track the legal areas where excellence is
needed. It seems wrong, though, to ignore the relative capacity for
judicial excellence in allocating judicial business. I assume that were
we dealing with the medical hypothetical, we would not ignore the
creative potential of the elite medical institution in allocating tasks.
Why should we do so in allocating judicial business? Even if we
agree that a litigant only has a right to a competent trial forum,
surely the rest of us can hope for excellence in shaping and applying
the law in areas where excellence is most needed. At bottom, the
real cost of ignoring the quality differential is not deprivation of a
particular litigant's right to justice, but the societal opportunity-cost
of failing to use the best resources we have to solve our most diffi-
cult legal problems.
The notion that a quality differential between minimal compe-
tence and a capacity for excellence does not matter in allocating
judicial business shades into a second, darker response. If all liti-
gants are entitled to is a competent judicial forum, perhaps we do
not need (or cannot afford) a trial bench capable of excellence. Such
an approach looks at the federal courts and sees inefficiency, unused
26. Redish, Judicial Parity, supra note 7, at 337-38. With regard to a litigant's entitlement to
a competent judge, Professor Redish states the following:
The issue in the parity debate is not whether, as a constitutional matter, state courts
are or are not a technically competent forum to adjudicate constitutional rights.
Rather the debate concerns whether the state and federal courts are equivalent, from
the litigant's perspective, to adjudicate such matters. . . . [Thus, the issue] is not so
much whether the court will find in favor of the [litigant's] constitutional right, but
whether, whatever decision the court reaches, we can be assured that decision was
reached on the basis of a fair and neutral assessment of law, policy, and facts.
Id. at 357-58; see also Wells, supra note 6, at 610 (arguing that "weak" parity means that "a
litigant will receive a constitutionally adequate hearing on a federal claim in state court").
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capacity and judicial self-indulgence. If competent judging is all
that we ask, surely federal judges can be expected to do more. In
fact, why shouldn't they simply function as another island of mini-
mal competence in the legal sea, doing just about what the state
courts are asked to do - only with a veneer of national substance.
We have already travelled much further down such a road than
we think. The steady proliferation of garden variety criminal cases
now threaten to engulf the federal trial bench in a mass of trials,
generally involving narcotics offenses, that call for competent judg-
ing, but nothing more.27 The practice of randomly diverting urban
street drug arrests into federal court simply uses up a scarce na-
tional resource for no reason other than political posturing. " The
sentencing guidelines have turned federal judges into bureaucrats at
the one phase in the criminal trial process that cries out for excel-
lent judgment.29 The twenty-five percent of the civil docket repre-
sented by diversity cases 30 are, often, literally indistinguishable from
identical cases pending in the state courts; cases generally requiring
competent judging, but nothing more. Unless checked, the growing
tendency to fill the federal trial courts with cases that do not have
any need for trial forum capable of excellence threatens to destroy
the capacity for excellence that has been the federal trial bench's
principal defining characteristic.
In 1988, I was a member of the United States delegation to a
Conference on the Rule of Law hosted by the Soviet Union. One of
the Soviet delegates told a story about Russian culture that captures
what we are slowly doing to the federal trial bench.
Imagine that an angel flies down and touches a Parisian on the shoulder.
"You may have anything you wish", the angel says. The Parisian would
respond: "I want great food, heart-stopping romance and marvelous
clothes". "You got it", says the angel.
The next morning the angel appears in Rome. "You may have anything
you wish", the angel repeats. The Roman replies: "I want fast cars, lots of
27. See William W. Schwarzer & Russell R. Wheeler, On the Federalization of the Adminis-
tration of Civil and Criminal Justice, 23 STETSON L. REV. 651, 695 (graphically illustrating in-
creases in federal drug and fraud trials).
28. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 150001, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
29. Jack B. Weinstein, A Trial Judge's Second Impression of the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 357, 364 (1992) ("Whereas sentencing once called for hours spent re-
flecting on the offense and the person, we judges are becoming rubber-stamp bureaucrats.").
30. See, e.g., American Inst. of Chem. Eng'rs v. Rebel-Friel Co., 682 F.2d 382, 392 (2d Cir.
1982) (stating that diversity cases comprise twenty-five percent of the civil cases commenced in
the federal district courts).
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money and a torrid love life". "You got it", says the angel.
The third morning the angel appears over Moscow. "Anything you wish is
yours" the angel assures a startled Muscovite. The Muscovite thinks for a
while and says: "My neighbor has a goat. I have no goat. I want you to kill
my neighbor's goat."
Assuming that we do not succeed in killing the federal goat, what
legal tasks should we ask it to perform? One obvious potential
model for the use of an elite trial forum is remedial. We could ask it
to backstop other courts by monitoring them and stepping in when
they fail. Using an elite trial forum to retry issues bungled by ear-
lier courts is a tempting use of the resource, especially when the
consequences of first-line judicial failure are extremely significant
and the likelihood of judicial failure is unacceptably high. In fact,
that is what we do in habeas corpus cases31 and in decisions to re-
prosecute on federal charges after a state acquittal.32 It is, however,
very inefficient. Remedial jurisdiction at the trial level forces two
trial courts (and their appellate consorts) to do the same work. If
the consequences and risk of first-line failure are so great, why not
ask the elite forum to perform the trial tasks in the first place?
In most habeas corpus settings, of course, such an approach is
impossible because the volume of ordinary criminal cases is too
great. In the habeas corpus area, the inefficiency of remedial trial
jurisdiction in the elite forum is justified by the serious consequence
of first-line judicial failure -unconstitutional loss of liberty. More-
over, in the 1960's, the potential for first-line judicial failure was
unacceptably high. The Warren Court revolution in criminal proce-
dure was in high gear." The ordinary courts were unfamiliar with
and skeptical about many of the new norms.34 On the other hand, as
ordinary courts and law enforcement officials became more familiar
with (and more sympathetic to) basic aspects of post-Warren Court
criminal procedure,3 5 the likelihood of first-line error decreased and
31. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 15.3 (2d ed. 1994) (provid-
ing a discussion of the procedures in habeas corpus review).
32. See infra notes 46-52 and accompanying text (providing examples of decisions to re-prose-
cute on federal charges after a state acquittal).
33. See generally Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure, the Burger Court, and the Legacy of
the Warren Court, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1320, 1321 (1977) (discussing the development of criminal
procedure under the Warren Court).
34. See Ann Althouse, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1485, 1490 (1987) (explaining that state courts were
very engaged in absorbing the new Warren Court standards).
35. Cf Peter Arenello, Rethinking of the Functions of Criminal Procedure: United States Su-
preme Court and Courts of Appeal, 72 GEO. L.J. 185, 240 (1983) (stating that the Warren Court
used rules rather than standards, thereby providing clear guidance to law enforcement officials).
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the need for an elite second trial court opinion decreased as well.
The recent history of habeas corpus jurisdiction is an accurate ba-
rometer of the perceived change in the need for a remedial trial
forum of excellence in the area of criminal procedure. 3 My own
view is that the Court has significantly underestimated the potential
for error in the first-line courts and seriously compromised the abil-
ity of the federal trial courts to assist in the growth of criminal pro-
cedure law. But, for the purposes of this discussion, the fine-tuning
(some might say judicial mugging) of habeas corpus is a textbook
example of deciding whether an elite remedial trial forum is worth
the cost.
Why use the federal trial courts, though, as a remedial forum in
settings where the federal court is capable of performing the trial
function as a first-line matter? In cases under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for
example, we have elected to forego the remedial model in favor of
treating the federal trial courts as the first-line judicial forum. 37
Two recent "remedial" responses to inept performances by ordinary
courts in high stakes criminal cases pose the issue squarely. In the
Rodney King and the Lemrick Nelson, Jr. cases, the Department of
Justice elected to re-try the defendants in federal court on federal
civil rights charges after they were acquitted of serious felonies in
state courts in California and New York. 38 What makes the two
cases significant is the nature of the judicial "failure" that triggered
remedial action. Under the Petite9 policy, federal courts have occa-
sionally been asked to re-try defendants on federal civil rights
charges after acquittal in state court when the state proceedings
were seriously deficient.40 But neither the King nor the Nelson pros-
36. See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 31, at § 15.5 (discussing the recent history of
habeas corpus).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 1343(a) (1994) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person.").
38. See Patricia Hurtado, "It's Not Fair." Nelson Distraught at Facing Federal Trial, NEWS-
DAY, Aug. 17, 1990, at A5; Susan H. Herman, Double Jeopardy All Over Again: Dual Sover-
eignty, Rodney King, and the ACLU, 41 UCLA L. REV. 609, 609 (1994).
39. The policy is named for Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529 (1960), which granted a
petition by the United States to vacate a federal conviction obtained after a state acquittal under
circumstances where no "compelling" need for a second trial existed. Id. at 531.
40. See Akhil Reed Amar & Jonathan L. Marcus, Double Jeopardy Law After Rodney King,
95 COLUM. L. REV, 1, 10-11 n.60 (1995) (stating that under the "Petite Policy," the Justice
Department will generally refrain from prosecuting an individual after a state prosecution for the
same crime, unless there are compelling reasons for a second trial); see also United States v.
Jones, 808 F.2d 561, 565 (7th Cir. 1986) (stating that under the "Petite Policy," a prosecutor
may obtain special approval for a successive prosecution in a case which the state proceeding has
[Vol. 44:797
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ecutions were deficient enough at the state level to warrant being
labelled shams or exercises in ineptitude. While they were hardly
models of excellence, each was a marginally competent, good faith
effort at prosecution. In each case, however, the best that could be
said about the state prosecution was that it was marginally compe-
tent. The original trial judge in the King case misbehaved by having
ex parte communications with the prosecution opening the door for
a disastrous change of venue to Simi Valley. 4' Moreover, the prose-
cutor made no effort to resist a trial in Simi Valley, despite the no-
toriously pro-police atmosphere there.4 The Nelson trial judge lost
control of his courtroom and the police performed very badly as wit-
nesses, to say nothing of investigators.43
The case for an excellent trial forum in both the King case and
Nelson case does not turn on the innate difficulty of the issues.
Rather, it turns on the need to reassure the nation that the legal
system is capable of handling racially-charged cases in a just man-
ner. The appearance of injustice presented by the weak performance
of the first-line courts in both cases created a powerful argument for
use of the elite federal trial court as a remedial forum. But the inef-
ficiency cost of using the federal courts that way is appalling. First
and foremost, requiring a defendant to stand trial again on the same
facts after an acquittal in a competently administered first-line pros-
ecution violates double jeopardy." After all, double jeopardy is
nothing more than a recognition that the cost to a defendant of mul-
left "substantial federal interests demonstrably unvindicated").
41. M. Shanara Gilbert, An Ounce of Prevention: A Constitutional Prescription for Choice of
Venue in Racially Sensitive Criminal Cases, 67 TUL. L REV. 1855, 1870-71 (1993) (stating that
while the venue issue was being appealed in the King case, the trial judge contacted the prosecu-
tor's office ex parte to inform them that the venue issue would be handled properly); id. at 1861-
62 ("Changing venue to a county where demographics suggested that a predominate number of
residents would be sympathetic to the defendant police officers and suspicious of the complaining
witness . . . cast a shadow on how judicial discretion was exercised in the venue decision.").
42. Id. at 1861, 1876 (stating that the prosecutor in the King case did not vigorously resist the
change of venue to a town that is the home to scores of retired police officers).
43. Pete Bowles & Patricia Hurtado, Crown Heights; The Story That Won't Go Away, Report
Will Rap Major Bungling in Nelson's Case, NEWSDAY, July 18, 1993, at 7 (stating that sources
indicated that police officers may have given prosecutors a different version of the events than they
gave to the jury); Michael Powell, Mayor to Blame - Riot Report Says Dinkins Failed to Order
Crackdown, NEWSDAY, July 21, 1993, at 3 (stating that the Girgentis riot report was critical of
the district attorney's office and the police investigation in the Nelson case).
44. US. CoNsT. amend. V ("No person shall ...be subject for the same offense to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb ...."); Herman, supra note 38, at 612 (stating that the American
Civil Liberties Union concluded that the defendant officers in the Rodney King case were twice
put in jeopardy for the same offense because the Supreme Court has never held that reprosecution
following an acquittal is permissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause).
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tiple trials on the same facts is unacceptably high, even if it means
reaching the wrong result. I know full well that the Supreme Court
has developed an end-run around double jeopardy in order to pre-
serve the remedial role of an elite federal trial court in extreme set-
tings. 5 But, assuming that the Court chooses to adhere to current
double jeopardy doctrine, every time the end-run is used, the de-
fendant risks being treated with fundamental unfairness. Moreover,
the remedial trial never really erases the sense of injustice created
by a poor performance by the first set of courts. If anything, it sim-
ply creates a new level of real and perceived injustice by appearing
to treat some victims better than others.
It would be far preferable to abandon the remedial model in such
cases in favor of a joint state-federal task force that would work
together to investigate the alleged crime, make a careful decision to
prosecute the case in a forum (state or federal) capable of dealing
with it effectively and, finally, cooperate in the actual prosecution.
The goal in such cases should not be first-line marginal competence
backstopped by remedial excellence. The cases deserve excellence
the first time they are tried.
In many settings, it should be possible to identify those legal dis-
putes that have a claim on a trial forum of excellence and route
them into the federal courts as a forum of first resort. It is, I believe,
what we have done through much of our history. We have identified
legal disputes of national scope that would most benefit from resolu-
tion in a trial forum of professional excellence and routed those dis-
putes into the federal trial courts. In the 19th century, when devel-
opment of a common law merchant for an expanding nation was the
great task of the legal system, a combination of diversity jurisdiction
and Swift v. Tyson46 entrusted the task to the federal trial courts.47
In the early years of the 20th century, when the legal relationship
45. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 195 (1959) (holding that under the Fifth Amend-
ment, a federal prosecution is not barred by a prior state prosecution of the same person for the
same acts); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 138-39 (1959) (holding that a subsequent state court
trial of defendant for armed robbery after defendant was acquitted in federal court of the same
acts does not deprive defendant of due process).
46. 41 U.S. 1 (1842). Swift involved a commercial law issue where there was no controlling
state statutory or constitutional provision, but there was state common law on point. Id. at 18. The
issue was whether the federal court should follow the state common law or whether it could de-
velop its own law. Id. The Supreme Court held that in a diversity case, if there is no state consti-
tution or statutory provision, and no local interest, the federal courts should develop their own
body of common law. Id. at 19.
47. Id.
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between the capital and the emerging regulatory state was a domi-
nant national concern, the word-magic of Ex parte Young, 8 federal
question jurisdiction, and causes of action for equitable relief spring-
ing directly from the constitution routed the cases to the federal
trial courts."9 During the past 35 years, when the national preoccu-
pation was articulation of a constitutional standard protecting the
politically weak from majoritarian overreaching, 50 the sudden dis-
covery of the "true" meaning of § 1983 in Monroe v. Pape51 en-
trusted the front-line trial role to the federal courts. 2
We should not be surprised, therefore, when efforts are made to
route contemporary issues of great importance to federal trial
courts. For example, when adherents of the Violence Against
Women Act 53 were successful in establishing a federal cause of ac-
tion for violence caused by animus against women, they sought a
federal trial forum precisely because they hoped that routing cases
about violence against women to an elite trial forum might help us
shed light on why men continue to beat women and how we can
make them stop." Similarly, when efforts are made to federalize the
law of mass torts,55 the hope is that elite trial fora can evolve an
optimal legal response to a crucial modern legal problem that has
48. 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits
against federal officers to enjoin violations of federal law).
49. Id. at 168.
50. Cf. Burt Neuborne, Judicial Review and Separation of Powers in France and the United
States, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 363 (1982) (discussing how to protect fundamental rights without
unduly interfering with majoritarian norms).
51. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). In Monroe, the plaintiff alleged that police officers broke into his
home, ransacked it, and held him at the police station without allowing him to contact an attor-
ney. Id. at 169. The issue before the Court was whether this conduct occurred under the color of
law. Id. at 172. The Court held that "[m]isuse of power possessed by virtue of state law and made
possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken
'under color of' state law." Id. at 184.
52. Id. at 191.
53. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, §§ 40001-40703, 108 Stat.
1796 (1994).
54. Steven B. Weisburd & Brian Levin, Symposium, "On the Basis of Sex": Recognizing Gen-
der-Based Bias Crimes, 5 STAN. L & POL'Y REV, 21, 24 (1994) (stating that the Violence
Against Women Act recognizes a federal cause of action in tort for gender motivated deprivations
of civil rights). Judith Resnik has argued that gender has played a significant role in deciding
whether an issue has been "important" enough to warrant federal jurisdiction. Housekeeping: The
Nature and Allocation of Work in the Federal Courts, 24 GA. L. REV. 909 (1990).
55. See Linda S. Mullenix, Federalizing Choice of Law for Mass-Tort Litigation, 70 TEx. L.
REV. 1623, 1630 (1992) ("[Rleformers have offered a piecemeal approach to mass-tort litigation
that would federalize jurisdiction and consolidation procedure, federalize various coercive devices
to collect individual cases in one forum and enjoin litigation elsewhere, and federalize applicable
law.") (footnotes omitted).
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resisted conventional solutions.56
The problem, of course, is that there are more hard problems
than there are elite legal resources. Using the medical analogy, ev-
eryone thinks that their sickness merits the elite health facility.
Worse, once an issue gets a foothold in federal court, it is almost
impossible to dislodge it. Thus, last century's (and last generation's)
needs now take up much of the federal court's time and energy. We
must, I believe, do two things if we are to derive the maximum ad-
vantage from our federal trial bench. First, in resolving the fierce
competition for new entry into the federal system, we must require a
claim to demonstrate that it requires more than merely a competent
trial judge. Such a showing might involve either the inherent com-
plexity of the issues, or the pressing nature of the subject matter.
Equally importantly, we must be prepared to jettison those claims
that once required more, but that because of changes in the law and
in the society, may now be adequately processed by forums of
competence.
I have left the most desirable approach for last, not because I
think it less important, but because I think it almost impossible to
achieve. Instead of killing the goat, we could try to provide a goat
for everybody. In other words, if federal trial courts exhibit flashes
of excellence because they have material advantages, we could at-
tempt to upgrade the resources available to state trial courts. The
problem is one of size and resources. Building and staffing an insti-
tution of excellence may become impossible once it reaches a given
size. Moreover, it may not be efficient to build fora of potential ex-
cellence to handle claims that merely require competence. My sense
is that, even if we improve the level of state trial judging, a quality
gap will exist into the future. Whether we will take full advantage
of the gap, ignore it, or level it down remains to be seen.
56. See id. at 1634 ("Perhaps the movement for a federalized choice-of-law regime in mass-tort
litigation will ultimately persuade some reformers of the general wisdom of federalized choice of
law.") (footnote omitted); Michael H. Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp: The Case for
Federal Choice of Law Statutes, 80 GEO. LJ. 1, 1-2 (1991) (stating that current state conflicts
schemes "generate waste and unfairness").
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